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REIFYING ANDERSON-BURDICK: VOTER PROTECTION IN THE 
TIME OF PANDEMIC AND BEYOND 
Keeley B. Gogul 
I. INTRODUCTION 
During the Fall of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic continued to affect 
the world in unrelenting waves, with the United States leading the way in 
both infections and deaths.1 As Election Day2 approached, the pandemic 
showed no sign of abating, triggering a series of lawsuits concerning state 
election laws.3 These cases arose first with ballot initiative challenges, 
where potential candidates and voters claimed that state laws mandating 
the number and type of signatures required for ballot initiatives placed a 
severe burden on citizens’ First Amendment rights in light of the COVID-
imposed lockdowns, stay-at-home orders, social distancing mandates and 
a generalized fear of the virus. Relatedly, the virus’s disproportionate 
impact on people of color, the elderly, and low-income citizens became 
apparent, raising claims that state voter registration laws have a 
discriminatory impact.4 
An important issue at the heart of many of these election law cases is 
what level of scrutiny a court should apply to challenges to state election 
laws. Little v. Reclaim Idaho5 was one of many ballot initiative cases 
working its way through the trial courts in the midst of the COVID-19 
pandemic. Writing for the concurrence on July 30, 2020, United States 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Roberts identified a circuit split regarding 
the proper analysis for ballot initiative cases challenged on First 
Amendment grounds.6 The split involves the Sixth and Ninth circuits on 
one side and the Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh on the other.7 The circuit 
split hinges on balancing the state’s interests with the First Amendment 
rights of its citizens. The First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits require some 
degree of scrutiny anytime a regulation burdens a person’s ability to place 
an initiative on the ballot.8 The other circuits have held that no First 
 
 1. John Elfein, Coronavirus (COVID-19) in the U.S. – Statistics & Facts, STATISA (Oct. 12, 
2020), https://www.statista.com/topics/6084/coronavirus-covid-19-in-the-us/. 
 2. November 3, 2020. 
 3. As of Oct. 23, there were 414 lawsuits pending. COVID-Related Election Litigation Tracker, 
STANFORD-MIT HEALTHY ELECTIONS PROJECT, https://healthyelections-case-tracker.stanford.edu/cases. 
 4. For a list of cases by state, see Voting Rights Litigation 2020, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 
(July 28, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/court-cases/voting-rights-litigation-2020. 
 5. Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 140 S. Ct. 2616 (2020). 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.  
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Amendment burden exists, and therefore no analysis of the state’s interest 
is required so long as the state law in question does not limit political 
discussion or petition circulation.9 
This Comment examines the evolution of that circuit split and 
concludes that the analyses used by the First, Sixth, and Ninth circuits 
(the “Anderson-Burdick” test or variations thereof) are more faithful to 
the Constitution, closely follow Supreme Court precedent, and when 
applied correctly, are structured in a way that avoids sweeping too 
broadly. This Comment will show how Anderson-Burdick, while initially 
developed in the context of ballot initiative cases, could provide extra 
protections for voters in cases where state election laws are being 
challenged on the ground that they have a discriminatory impact due to 
COVID-19. These protections could be especially important as the 
Roberts’ Court continues to engage in what seems to be a “crusade” to 
roll back protections for voters’ rights.10  
Section II of this Comment traces the development of Anderson-
Burdick, as well as ways the courts have struggled to apply it. Section 
II(B) analyzes the circuit split Chief Justice Roberts identified in his 
majority opinion in Reclaim Idaho, revealing that the cases he used to 
illustrate the circuit split were inapposite, and actually supported the use 
of the framework as applied by the First, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits. 
Section II(C) also reviews COVID-19’s disparate impact on racial and 
other minorities and explains how courts are using Anderson-Burdick to 
resolve cases arising as a result of the disparity. Finally, Section III 
demonstrates how the test’s shortcomings are proving to be strengths, 
particularly when it is combined with other analyses in context of the 
Voting Rights Act. Section III argues that Anderson-Burdick should be 
adopted by all the circuits in order to ensure robust voter protections and 
avoid mass disenfranchisement.  
II. BACKGROUND 
This Section begins by tracing the development and application of 
Anderson-Burdick in the context of First Amendment challenges to ballot 
 
 9. Id.  
 10. Ian Millhiser, Chief Justice Roberts’s Lifelong Crusade Against Voting Rights, Explained, 
VOX, (Sep. 18, 2020),  
https://www.vox.com/21211880/supreme-court-chief-justice-john-roberts-voting-rights-act-election-
2020; see also Richard L. Hasen, Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp Right 
Turn but with Speed Bumps and Surprising Twists, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1597 (2016); Lydia Hardy, Voter 
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initiative laws. Section II(B) illustrates how the circuit split developed. 
Section II(C) includes an analysis of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Crawford v. Marion County, the most recent case in which the Court 
addressed Anderson-Burdick.11 Section II(D) discusses the circuit split 
regarding the application of Anderson-Burdick in ballot initiative cases 
arising specifically as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and 
acknowledged by Chief Justice Roberts in Reclaim Idaho. Section II(E) 
concludes with a discussion of the disparate impact COVID-19 is having 
on racial minorities, voters with disabilities, the elderly, and low-income 
Americans and how these disparities are amplifying existing barriers to 
voting for these citizens. 
A. Developing the Framework 
In ballot initiative cases, the First, Sixth, and Ninth circuits have 
adopted the Supreme Court’s Anderson-Burdick balancing test to 
determine whether or not a state’s professed interest outweighs the burden 
it imposes on voters’ First Amendment rights. 12 The Supreme Court 
recognized that state regulation of ballot initiatives potentially burdens 
free speech when the regulations “limit political expression”13 or 
“significantly inhibit communication with voters about proposed political 
change.”14 Anderson-Burdick applies a sliding scale analysis to ballot 
initiative laws based on the degree of burden the laws place on voters’ 
First Amendment rights. The test developed from two Supreme Court 
cases where state ballot initiative laws were challenged under the First 
Amendment.15 
The first part of Anderson-Burdick developed from a case challenging 
Ohio’s early filing deadline for independent candidates.16 In Anderson v. 
Celebreeze, the Supreme Court determined that state laws placing a 
burden on voters’ constitutional rights must withstand strict scrutiny.17 
The Court held that an Ohio statute that required an independent 
presidential candidate to file a statement of candidacy and supporting 
nominating petition five months prior to the general election 
unconstitutionally burdened the voting and associational rights of that 
 
 11. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 12. The Ninth Circuit refers to the same test as the Angle v. Miller test, but there is no substantive 
difference between the tests. For purposes of this Comment, “Anderson-Burdick” test will encompass the 
Ninth Circuit as well.  
 13. Meyer v. Grant, 489 U.S. 414, 417 (1988). 
 14. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 192 (1999). 
 15. Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 16. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780. 
 17. Id. 
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candidate’s supporters.18 The Court articulated the legal standard for 
challenges to a state’s election laws: 
[A] court must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted 
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments…then evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State 
as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, 
the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of 
these interests, it must also consider the extent to which those interests 
make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.19 
The Court held Ohio’s filing deadline burdened the associational rights of 
non-party voters and candidates.20 In addition, it “place[d] a significant 
state-imposed restriction” on the national election because the President 
and Vice President necessarily represented all voters, and therefore votes 
cast in one state impacted citizens in all states because those votes 
affected the outcome of the federal elections.21 The Court noted that the 
deadline disproportionately limited political participation by an 
identifiable political group, which made it difficult for the State to support 
its early filing law.22 
Ohio asserted three interests in reply: (1) an interest in allowing voters 
sufficient time to educate themselves about the candidate; (2) an interest 
in equal treatment for party candidates and independents; and (3) an 
interest in political stability.23  The Court rejected these arguments as 
justification for the significant burdens the law placed on candidates and 
voters. The Court reasoned that “if the State has open to it a less drastic 
way of satisfying its legitimate interests, it may not choose a legislative 
scheme that broadly stifles the exercise of fundamental personal 
liberties.”24 In other words, a state law that burdens constitutional rights 
must be narrowly-tailored to serve the state’s compelling interest; it must 
withstand strict scrutiny. 
The second half of Anderson-Burdick, set forth in Burdick v. Takushi, 
refined the strict scrutiny analysis from Anderson by adding a balancing 
test to determine the degree of scrutiny required.25 In Burdick, the 
Supreme Court considered whether Hawaii's prohibition on write-in votes 
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.26 The case began with a 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 781. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 792-93. 
 23. Id. at 781. 
 24. Id. at 806 (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 59 (1973)). 
 25. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
 26. Id.  
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challenge to Hawaii election laws that prohibited write-in voting. Upon 
certification of questions by the district court regarding the 
constitutionality of write-in votes, the Hawaii Supreme Court held that 
write-in votes were barred by Hawaii laws and these laws were consistent 
with its Constitution.27  
The district court then granted the petitioner’s motion for summary 
judgment and injunctive relief but stayed the orders pending appeal.28 On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the burden imposed by the prohibition 
on write-in votes was justified, because the state provided other 
procedures that ensured easy access to the ballot and alternative ways for 
the petitioner to express his political beliefs.29 The court expressly 
declined to follow the lead of the Fourth Circuit, which held that 
fundamental rights were implicated by the casting and counting of write-
in votes, and therefore any state laws burdening those rights were 
unconstitutional if they could not withstand strict scrutiny.30 The Supreme 
Court thus granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on this issue between 
the Ninth and Fourth Circuit.31  
The Court rejected the argument that any law that burdens the right to 
vote must be subject to strict scrutiny.32 Instead, the Court explained that 
laws governing elections “invariably impose some burden upon 
individual voters” and held that requiring every regulation to survive strict 
scrutiny would “tie the hands of the States” and prevent them from 
regulating fair and disciplined elections.33 The Court introduced a new 
element to the standard set forth in Anderson, holding that courts should 
first determine the degree of burden on First and Fourteenth Amendment 
rights and then apply the proportionate amount of scrutiny to the attendant 
state laws.34 Applying this analysis, the Court held that the state’s law 
prohibiting write-in votes imposed “only a limited burden” on voters’ 
First Amendment rights and Hawaii’s interest in protecting the integrity 
of its elections provided adequate justification for the law.35 
Thus, Anderson and Burdick combine to create a balancing test which 
“weighs the burdens’ on voters rights by a particular voting law or 
practice against asserted state interests; the heavier the burden on voters’ 
rights recognized by the court, the stricter the judicial scrutiny.”36  
 
 27. Burdick v. Takushi, 776 P.2d 824 (1989).  
 28. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 431. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Dixon v. Maryland State Admin. Bd. of Election L., 878 F.2d 776 (4th Cir. 1989). 
 31. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 432. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 433. 
 34. Id. at 434.  
 35. Id. at 439. 
 36. Richard L. Hasen, Three Pathologies of American Voting Rights Illuminated by the COVID-
5
Gogul: Reifying Anderson-Burdick
Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
264 UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90 
B. To Apply or Not to Apply 
Since Burdick, some circuits have applied Anderson-Burdick to cases 
challenging ballot initiative laws generally.37 By contrast, other circuits 
dispense with any sort of review, arguing that as long as the election law 
in question does not directly limit political discussion or petition 
circulation, the First Amendment is not implicated.38 This Section 
examines cases from the First and Tenth Circuits that illustrate the 
difference. 
The First Circuit has established a standard for determining what level 
of scrutiny to apply when faced with First Amendment challenges to 
ballot initiative laws.39  In Wirzburger v. Galvin, the court held that laws 
having only incidental effects on speech did not implicate the First 
Amendment and must withstand only rational basis review, but laws 
prohibiting ballot initiatives on a particular subject constituted a 
restriction on speech sufficient to trigger intermediate scrutiny.40 
Wirzburger concerned an effort by parents to amend the Massachusetts 
Constitution via popular initiative.41  Because the initiative proposed to 
eliminate a prohibition on state funding for private schools with religious 
affiliations, it was excluded from the initiative process by a provision of 
the Massachusetts Constitution which prohibited petitions that explicitly 
related to “religious institutions.”42 The parents argued that this exclusion 
violated their First Amendment rights because it was a “content-based 
restriction on core political speech,” and thus should be subject to strict 
scrutiny.43 
Applying Anderson-Burdick,44 the First Circuit initially considered the 
burden the state law placed on the First Amendment.45 The court 
determined the use of the initiative process constituted expressive conduct 
and involved core political speech, thus implicating the First 
Amendment.46 As the court explained, ballot initiatives “provide[] a 
 
19 Pandemic, and How to Treat and Cure Them, 19 ELECTION L.J. 263, 272 (2020). 
 37. See e.g., Angle v. Miller, 673 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2012), Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 
278 (1st Cir. 2005); SawariMedia, LLC v. Whitmer, 963 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 38. See e.g., Jones v. Markiewicz-Qualkinbush, 892 F.3d 935 (7th Cir.); Initiative and Referendum 
Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1085 (10th Cir. 2006); Dobrovolny v. Moore, 126 F.3d 1111 (8th Cir. 
1997). 
 39. Wirzburger v. Galvin, 412 F.3d 271, 278 (1st Cir. 2005). 
 40. Id.  
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 275. 
 43. Id. 
 44. The court does not explicitly reference Anderson-Burdick by name but applies each element 
of the framework. 
 45. Wirzburger, 412 F.3d at 276. 
 46. Id. 
6
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uniquely provocative method of spurring public debate” and thus 
constitute core political speech according to Supreme Court precedent.47 
However, the court recognized that the regulation at issue did not directly 
target communicative impact, but rather was “aim[ed] at preventing the 
act of generating…constitutional amendments about certain subjects by 
initiative.”48 Therefore, the court found the burden on speech was 
incidental to the law and strict scrutiny was not required.49 However, 
because the “expression is affected by the regulations of the state initiative 
process,” the court determined that intermediate scrutiny was warranted.50 
Accordingly, the court moved to the second step of the analysis and 
examined the state’s interest in regulating the ballot initiative process. The 
court concluded the state’s interest in maintaining the proper 
constitutional balance between the Free Exercise Clause and the 
Establishment Clause was substantial.51 The court then balanced the 
burden on the Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights with the substantial 
interest of the state, holding that because the statutes were narrowly 
tailored, they survived intermediate scrutiny.52  
By contrast, the Tenth Circuit rejected this analysis in Initiative & 
Referendum Institute v. Walker, even while expressly acknowledging that 
doing so created a circuit split.53 In Walker, the Plaintiffs claimed that a 
Utah state law that required supermajority approval of wildlife 
management ballot initiatives imposed a “chilling effect” on the exercise 
of citizens’ First Amendment rights.54 In “respectfully disagreeing” with 
the First Circuit, the court held that such a provision fell short of 
implicating freedom of speech at all.55  
Sitting en banc, the Tenth Circuit declined to consider the regulation’s 
incidental effects on speech or communicative conduct.56 Instead, the 
court stated that the degree of scrutiny required turned on whether the 
laws in question “regulate or restrict the communicative conduct of 
persons advocating a position in a referendum” or whether the laws 
simply govern the process of enacting legislation.57 According to the 
court, the former trigger strict scrutiny and the latter require no 
 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 277. 
 49. Id. at 275. 
 50. Id. at 279. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 276. 
 53. Initiative and Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1085 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1099. 
 57. Id. at 1100. 
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constitutional scrutiny at all.58 Although the court agreed that the First 
Amendment afforded protection to the political speech surrounding a 
ballot initiative, it held that it did not provide any guarantees that all points 
of view are “equally likely to prevail.”59 Therefore, intermediate scrutiny 
does not apply to laws that structure elections even when they make some 
outcomes harder to achieve than others.60 The court rejected the Plaintiff’s 
alternative argument that the legislation is not content-neutral on the same 
grounds; the regulation at issue in this case regulated process rather than 
speech.61 Thus, according to the Tenth Circuit, First Amendment analysis 
was unwarranted in this case and Utah’s law was upheld without review.  
Judge Lucero dissented and faulted the court’s decision because it 
“free[d] from constitutional scrutiny conduct by a majority of voters that 
has the potential to chill political speech on the basis of content by 
imposing discriminatory election requirements.”62 The dissent went on to 
say that states cannot “rig election laws” by applying content-based 
supermajority requirements without running afoul of the First 
Amendment.63 Drawing a comparison between rigged election laws such 
as this one and partisan gerrymandering, Judge Lucero's dissent 
referenced the dissent in the gerrymandering case Veith v. Jubelirer, 
where Justice Kennedy stated that “First Amendment concerns arise 
where a State enacts a law that has the purpose and effect of subjecting a 
group of voters or their party to disfavored treatment by reason of their 
views.”64 Should those circumstances arise, Justice Kennedy advised that 
First Amendment violations can only be alleviated if the State 
demonstrates a compelling interest in that law.65 According to Judge 
Lucero, the Wirzburger court’s First Amendment analysis was proper for 
ballot initiative cases because it allowed the State to prevail if the law in 
question survived intermediate scrutiny. 
C. The Supreme Court’s Guidance (or Lack Thereof) Concerning 
Anderson-Burdick 
The Supreme Court has directly addressed Anderson-Burdick only 
once since the emergence of the circuit split, issuing a plurality opinion 
in Crawford v. Marion County that resulted in two conflicting 
 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 1101. 
 60. Id. at 1099, 1102. 
 61. Id. at 1103. 
 62. Id. at 1110 (Lucero, J. dissenting). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 1112 (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 314 (2004)) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 65. Id.  
8
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interpretations of Anderson-Burdick.66 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, expressly 
applied Anderson-Burdick to an Indiana statute requiring voters to have a 
form of government-issued photo identification in order to vote.67 Stevens 
found that Indiana’s “precise interests” in preventing voter fraud and 
protecting the integrity of elections did not unconstitutionally burden 
voters.68 Additionally, when Petitioners asked the Court to consider the 
burden placed on a specific subset of the voter population rather than the 
population as a whole, the Court conceded that such a burden may 
necessitate a higher degree of scrutiny and therefore a more compelling 
and narrowly tailored state law.69 However, the Court held that the 
Petitioner failed to prove that such a burden existed and therefore did not 
rule on the question.70 
Writing separately and concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia, 
together with Justices Thomas and Alito, faulted the Court for reading 
Anderson together with Burdick to create a balancing test.71 Instead, 
Justice Scalia insisted that Burdick distilled the Anderson opinion into a 
“two-track approach:” laws severely burdening the right to vote trigger 
strict scrutiny, while others receive only rational basis review.72 
Effectively, Justice Scalia’s binary interpretation disclaimed the 
balancing component of Anderson-Burdick and created the divided 
approach to applying it at issue today. 
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia elided the interim step articulated in 
Burdick and applied by many lower courts since. Insisting on the “two-
track” approach, Justice Scalia failed to abide by the Burdick court’s 
mandate that courts must consider the extent to which the state’s interests 
in passing a law require the subsequent burden on voters’ rights created 
by the law.73  
 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens rejected that interpretation, 
noting that “[t]he Burdick opinion was explicit in its endorsement and 
adherence to Anderson…the Court applied the ‘flexible standard’ set 
 
 66. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008). 
 67. Id. at 191. 
 68. Id. at 203. 
 69. Id. at 202. 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 72. Id. at 205. 
 73. The Burdick court explicitly stated that “A court considering a challenge to a state election law 
must weigh ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by 
the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which 
those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.’” Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, at 
434, (1992) (emphasis added) (first quoting Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983): and then 
quoting Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208, 213 (1986)). 
9
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forth in Anderson.”74  
Justice Souter authored a dissenting opinion, joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, and explicitly endorsed and applied the combined Anderson-
Burdick framework with its sliding scale of scrutiny.75 Thus, in the 
Crawford decision, five justices affirmed the use of Anderson-Burdick, 
three justices viewed it as a binary test only, and a single Justice evaluated 
the burden from a disproportionate impact perspective.76  
Because the Supreme Court has not revisited Anderson-Burdick since 
the Crawford plurality opinion, lower courts continue to apply two 
different versions of the test—either the flexible standard set forth by 
Justice Stevens in the plurality and applied in a separate dissenting 
opinion by Justice Souter,77 or the binary, all-or-nothing test advocated 
by Justice Scalia in the concurrence. The challenges created by this lack 
of clarity are amplified in the context of cases arising as a result of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.  
D. COVID-19 and the Current Circuit Split 
In 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic strained the American election 
system in unprecedented ways. Beginning in mid-March, local and state 
governments imposed various restrictions on citizens, ranging from 
mandatory stay-at-home orders to limits on the number of people 
permitted to gather outdoors.78 By the end of March, more than ninety 
percent of the U.S. was under some sort of stay-at-home order.79 The 
severity and tenacity of the outbreak in the U.S. led the Centers for 
Disease Control to issue special guidance for June’s election polling 
locations, encouraging states to expand the number of voting options, 
extend the amount of time available for voting, and take additional 
measures to protect those at increased risk for severe illness.80  
 
 74. Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election B., 553 U.S. 191, n. 8 (2008). 
 75. Id. at 209 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 76. Justice Stevens, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg all apply 
the sliding scale balancing test as understood in Anderson combined with Burdick; Justices Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito apply the binary test. Id.  
 77. “Given the legitimacy of interests on both sides, we have avoided preset levels of scrutiny in 
favor of a sliding-scale balancing analysis: the scrutiny varies with the effect of the regulation at issue.” 
Id. at 210 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 78. Amanda Moreland et al., Timing of State and Territorial COVID-19 Stay-at-Home Orders and 
Changes in Population Movement — United States, March 1–May 31, 2020, CENTERS FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. (Sep. 4, 2020), 
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6935a2.htm. 
 79. Elfein, supra note 1. 
 80. Considerations for Election Polling Locations: Interim Guidance to Prevent Spread of 
Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19), CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (June 22, 
2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html. 
10
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With the election cycle ramping up amid the pandemic, courts were 
soon faced with legal challenges to state election laws.81 The increasing 
burden on the courts makes it even more imperative that they have a clear 
test under which to evaluate challenges to states’ voting laws, but the 
cases on either side of the circuit split identified by Chief Justice Roberts 
in Reclaim Idaho reveal that the confusion created by the Supreme 
Court’s plurality opinion in Crawford remains. 
In Reclaim Idaho, the State sought a stay pending appeal from a district 
court order requiring Idaho to certify a ballot initiative with less than the 
required number of signatures or to allow the initiative more time and 
leeway to gather digital signatures online in order to reach the requisite 
number in light of the challenges presented by the pandemic.82 The 
Supreme Court granted the stay.  In his concurrence, Chief Justice Roberts 
noted that the Court would likely grant certiorari in the case, were it 
requested, in order to resolve a circuit split regarding the proper analysis 
to apply to election administration laws challenged under the First 
Amendment.83  
A brief review of the cases mentioned by the Chief Justice in Reclaim 
Idaho provides a useful overview into the application of Anderson-
Burdick during the pandemic. Contrary to Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion, 
the circuits are not split on when the test is applicable, but rather on how 
to apply it.  
The Sixth Circuit applied Anderson-Burdick in two separate pandemic-
related cases.84 The first case challenged Michigan’s signature 
requirement during the COVID-19 lockdown.85 In SawariMedia LLC. v. 
Whitmer, the Sixth Circuit denied the government’s motion to stay a 
preliminary injunction imposed by the district court that enjoined the state 
from enforcing its signature requirement for ballot initiatives.86 The State 
argued that the district court erred in applying Anderson-Burdick to find 
a severe burden on the Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights and further 
argued that the court abused its discretion by declining to accept the 
State’s proposed extension to the petition deadline.87 The court disagreed 
on both counts. The court upheld the lower court’s application of 
Anderson-Burdick, which found that the combination of Michigan’s stay-
 
 81. Pam Fessler, Coronavirus Likely to Supercharge Election-Year Lawsuits Over Voting Rights, 
NPR (Apr. 17, 2020), https://www.npr.org/2020/04/17/836671427/coronavirus-likely-to-supercharge-
election-year-lawsuits-over-voting-rights. 
 82. Little v. Reclaim Idaho, 140 S. Ct. 2616 (2020). 
 83. Id. 
 84. SawariMedia, LLC v. Whitmer, 963 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2020); Thompson v. DeWine, 959 F.3d 
804 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 85. SawariMedia, 963 F.3d at 595. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 596- 97. 
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at-home order and the state’s signature requirement for ballot initiatives 
violated the First Amendment by creating a severe restriction on 
SawariMedia’s access to the ballot.88 Further, the court noted that the 
State proffered no evidence that the district court was obliged to accept 
its remedy, and thus the State did not meet its burden of proof that it was 
entitled to a stay.89 Finally, the court noted, and the State conceded, that 
current Sixth Circuit precedent favored applying Anderson-Burdick to 
ballot initiative cases.90 
Shortly after SawariMedia was decided, the Sixth Circuit heard 
Thompson v. DeWine, where a similar challenge to ballot initiative laws 
yielded a different result. Like in Sawari, the plaintiffs filed a First 
Amendment action claiming that the combination of Ohio’s ballot 
initiative laws and the Governor’s stay-at-home orders presented an 
unconstitutional burden on the First Amendment rights of individuals 
seeking to include an initiative on the ballot.91 The court applied 
Anderson-Burdick and found that because the State included an 
exemption to the stay-at-home order for people gathering for First 
Amendment reasons, the burden on voters’ rights was only intermediate.92 
The court found that the State’s interest in preventing election fraud 
justified the burden on the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights and thus the 
state was likely to prevail on the merits of its claim.93 Therefore, the court 
reversed the lower court’s granting of the plaintiff’s preliminary 
injunction.94  
The Thompson court’s analysis closely parallels the Eighth Circuit's 
decision in Miller v. Thurston—Chief  Justice Roberts contrasted this case 
with SawariMedia to illustrate the circuit split regarding how to apply 
Anderson-Burdick.95 The plaintiffs in Miller alleged that the combination 
of state laws requiring ballot initiative petitions to be signed by in-person 
witnesses and notarized together with government restrictions limiting in-
person contact in response to the pandemic resulted in an unconstitutional 
burden on the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.96 The district court 
expressly applied Anderson-Burdick and determined that the plaintiffs 
 
 88. Id. at 596. 
 89. Id. at 597. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Thompson v. DeWine, 959 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 92. Id. at 811. 
 93. Id.; but see Richard Hasen, Direct Democracy Denied: The Right to Initiative During a 
Pandemic, U. CHI. L. REV. BLOG (June 26, 2020), 
https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2020/06/26/pandemic-initiative-hasen/ (criticizing the Court’s 
reasoning and arguing in support of upholding the district court decision). 
 94. Thompson, 959 F. 3d at 811. 
 95. Miller v. Thurston, 967 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2020). 
 96. Miller v. Thurston, 462 F.Supp. 3d 930 (W.D. Ark.), rev'd, 967 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2020). 
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established a likelihood of success on the merits of their claims. The court 
found that the government’s interest in preventing fraud in the election 
process was compelling, but the witness and signature requirements were 
not narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.97 Accordingly, the district 
court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.98  
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the trial court, but not for 
applying Anderson-Burdick. Instead, the court of appeals determined that 
only the in-person signature requirement applied in the context of 
COVID-19 sufficiently burdened the First Amendment to trigger strict 
scrutiny.99 Relying on circuit precedent, the court applied Anderson-
Burdick’s “sliding standard of review.”100 Therefore, the court found 
Anderson-Burdick’s application to the case was appropriate but reversed 
the lower court’s determination that the burden on the plaintiffs was 
severe.101 Rather, the Eighth Circuit found that the State’s interest in 
protecting the integrity of its initiative processes paired with safe 
alternatives for satisfying the witness and signature requirements did not 
unduly burden the plaintiffs and therefore survived intermediate 
scrutiny.102 
In all three cases, the lower courts applied Anderson-Burdick and the 
appellate courts endorsed its application, establishing Anderson-Burdick 
as the applicable analytical test. The circuit split was based not on whether 
to apply Anderson-Burdick; the courts divided only in their evaluations of 
the states’ interests in passing election laws and the attendant burdens they 
placed on voters.  
E. COVID-19’s Disparate Impact on Some Voters 
The COVID-19 pandemic interacts with voting laws in ways that 
directly impact the burden courts must evaluate in election law cases. 
Racial minorities, voters with disabilities, the elderly, and low-income 
Americans already face barriers to voting based on structural inequities 
and racism in the United States election system.103 These disparities are 
 
 97. Id. at 942. 
 98. Id. at 948. 
 99. Miller, 967 F.3d at 738. 
 100. Id. at 739.  
 101. Id. at 741. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Samantha Artiga et al., Racial Disparities in COVID-19: Key Findings from Available Data 
and Analysis, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Aug. 17, 2020) 
https://www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/racial-disparities-covid-19-key-findings-
available-data-analysis/; Lilian Aluri, COVID-19 and the Disability Vote, AMERICAN ASSOC. OF PEOPLE 
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amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic.104  
Research reveals that people with disabilities are more susceptible to 
contracting COVID-19 and frequently endure comorbidities resulting in 
complications and higher instances of death.105 Data collected in New 
York state found that people with disabilities are 2.5 times more likely to 
die of COVID-19.106 When combined with accessibility challenges and 
other barriers to voting that many people with disabilities experience in 
election years, COVID-19 is requiring these voters to “make an 
impossible decision this election—between protecting [their] health, and 
even [their] live[s], and participating in democracy.”107  
Similar barriers exist for Black and other minority voters. In particular, 
a recent study showed that Blacks who contract COVID-19 are two times 
more likely to require hospitalization and three times more likely to die 
from the disease than other racial and ethnic groups.108 Hispanics and 
other Latinos are also experiencing higher rates of infection and deaths 
than white people in states around the country.109 Like people with 
disabilities, Black and other racial minorities already suffer from systemic 
voter suppression and disenfranchisement in part by way of fewer 
convenient polling locations and longer wait times at the polls.110  
COVID-19 amplifies minority voters’ disadvantages. For example, 
during Wisconsin’s  April primary election, measures undertaken by the 
State in response to the pandemic reduced the number of available polling 
locations across the state.111 Milwaukee, whose  population is 57.6 
percent Black, Hispanic, or Latino, had only five polling stations to serve 
its population of 592,000—down from the 175 stations it would normally 
have.112 Not only did this decision compound the risks for Black and 
 
 104. What Democracy Looks Like: Protecting Voting Rights in the US during the COVID-19 
Pandemic, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Sep. 22, 2020) https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/09/22/what-
democracy-looks/protecting-voting-rights-us-during-covid-19-pandemic#. 
 105. Artiga, supra note 104 at 1. 
 106. Id. at 11. 
 107. Id. at 22. 
 108. Sharon E. Moore et. al., Six Feet Apart of Six Feet Under: The Impact of COVID-19 on the 
Black Community, DEATH STUD. (July 2020), 
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/07481187.2020.1785053. 
 109. Daniel Wood, As Pandemic Deaths Add Up, Racial Disparities Persist — And In Some Cases 
Worsen, NPR (Sep. 23, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/09/23/914427907/as-
pandemic-deaths-add-up-racial-disparities-persist-and-in-some-cases-worsen. 
 110. M. Keith Chen et.al., Racial Disparities in Voting Wait Times: Evidence from Smartphone 
Data, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH., Working Paper 26487 (Nov. 2019), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w26487; see also Social Equity and COVID-19: The Case of African 
Americans, 80 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 5, 820-26 (2020). 
 111. John Curiel & Angelo Dagonel, Election Administration Challenges and Effects in Wisconsin, 
LAWFARE (Sep. 25, 2020), https://www.lawfareblog.com/election-administration-challenges-and-effects-
wisconsin. 
 112. Quick Facts: Milwaukee, Wisconsin, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, 
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minority voters at disproportionate rates, but it resulted in a demonstrable 
increase in COVID-19 cases. According to the Bureau of Economic 
Research, “a 10% increase in in-person voters per polling location [was] 
associated with an 18.4% increase in the COVID-19 positive test rate two 
to three weeks later.”113  
Similar burdens on voting during the pandemic exist for other distinct 
groups of Americans. Elderly voters are at exceptionally high risk of 
contracting the virus and may face additional challenges regarding access 
to transportation, technology, and other resources needed to participate in 
the election process.114 Similarly, COVID-19 has had a disparate impact 
on low-income Americans who experience many of the same burdens as, 
and often intersect with, the distinct subsets of voters mentioned above.115 
Taken as a whole, when courts fail to protect the rights of these voters, 
they run the risk of “massive disenfranchisement” and force voters to 
“brave the polls, endangering their own and others' safety… or lose their 
right to vote, through no fault of their own.”116  
The district court in Thompson recognized the importance of rigorous 
voter protections during the pandemic:  
[T]hese are not normal times. So, the question is whether the COVID-19 
pandemic and Ohio's stay-at-home orders increased the burden that Ohio's 
ballot-initiative regulations place on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment 
rights. We must answer this question from the perspective of the people 
and organizations affected by Ohio's ballot initiative restrictions and 
considering all opportunities these parties had to exercise their rights.117 
Because of its burden-specific focus, Anderson-Burdick, including the 
rigorous interrogation of the state’s proffered interests, provides the 
courts with a means of addressing these issues.  
District courts can and do apply Anderson-Burdick to resolve 
challenges to state election laws in light of the pandemic. For example, in 
People First of Alabama v. Merrill, the plaintiffs were a group of senior 
citizens who also had disabilities or underlying medical conditions.118 The 
 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/milwaukeecitywisconsin (last visited Dec. 4, 2020); See also Hasen, 
supra note 35 at 264. 
 113. Chad D. Cotti et.al., The Relationship Between In-Person Voting and COVID-19, NAT’L 
BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH., Working Paper 27187 (May 2020), https://www.nber.org/papers/w27187. 
 114. Abigail Abrams, Nursing Home Residents Struggle to Vote Amid the Coronavirus Pandemic, 
TIME (Oct. 10, 2020), https://time.com/5898746/elderly-covid-election-2020/. 
 115. Wyatt Koma, et. al., Low-Income and Communities of Color at Higher Risk of Serious Illness 
if Infected with Coronavirus, KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (May 7, 2020), 
https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/low-income-and-communities-of-color-at-higher-
risk-of-serious-illness-if-infected-with-coronavirus/.  
 116. Republican Nat'l Comm. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 140 S. Ct. 1205, 1209, 1211 (2020), 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
 117. Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804, 809 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 118. People First of Alabama v. Merrill, 467 F. Supp. 3d 1179 (N.D. Ala. 2020). 
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plaintiffs challenged Alabama election laws requiring witnesses to be 
present for absentee ballots, submission of photo ID for absentee voters, 
and prohibitions on curbside voting, arguing that these measures violated 
their fundamental right to vote in light of the pandemic.119 Considering 
the severity of the burden that absentee ballot witness requirements placed 
on voters, the court acknowledged that the requirements imposed a “more 
significant burden” on voters at increased risk of COVID-19 
complications because of their “age, disability,…and race.”120 The court, 
relying on the plurality’s use of Anderson-Burdick in Crawford, closely 
analyzed the state’s proffered interest in reducing election fraud. The 
court found that the desire to reduce election fraud, though reasonable, 
did not justify the burden that the witness requirements placed on the 
plaintiffs’ voting rights.121 After similar analysis, the court concluded that 
both the photo ID requirement and the ban on curbside voting failed 
intermediate scrutiny, and therefore the plaintiffs were likely to succeed 
on the merits.122 
Anderson-Burdick’s inherent flexibility suggests it could be used to 
adjudicate other election law cases, particularly those arising under § 2 of 
the Voting Rights Act (VRA).  Currently, the Supreme Court’s guidance 
regarding § 2 VRA claims comes from Thornburg v. Gingles, a vote 
dilution case where challenges were brought against the use of 
multimember districts in North Carolina’s legislative apportionment. In 
determining whether or not plaintiffs had a valid claim under § 2 of the 
VRA, the Court held that a § 2 vote dilution claim exists when the voting 
rule or practice in question “interacts with social and historical conditions 
to cause an inequality in the opportunities enjoyed by [B]lack and white 
voters.”123  
There is a significant body of scholarly commentary discussing 
potential challenges to § 2 of the VRA,124 including the Court’s decision 
in Shelby County v. Holder, which held that § 5 of the VRA was 
unconstitutional.125 Many scholars fear that the current conservative 
majority on the Court will look for ways to similarly dismiss § 2 and thus 
 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 1207. 
 121. Id. at 1213. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986). 
 124. See Christopher Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional 
Elections, and Common Claw Statutes, 160 U. PENN. L. REV. 377, 416 (2012); Janai Nelson, The Causal 
Context of Disparate Vote Denial, 54 B.C. L. REV. 579, 586 (2013); Hayden Johnson, Vote Denial and 
Defense: A Strategic Enforcement Proposal for Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 108 GEORGETOWN L. 
J. 449 (2020). 
 125. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013). 
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significantly rollback voter protections.126 As such, these scholars are 
hard at work recommending additional standards the Court could apply if 
it were to grant certiorari on a § 2 vote denial case.  
Without a Supreme Court standard for evaluating vote denial cases, 
several district courts have crafted a two-part test that requires plaintiffs 
to show that (1) a disparate impact on minorities exists due to the state 
practice, and (2) the impact is causally linked to the interaction between 
the practice and social and historical conditions.127 
Daniel Tokaji, a dean and professor of constitutional and election law 
at the University of Wisconsin Law School, identifies Anderson-Burdick 
as “the constitutional standard applicable to burdens on electoral 
participation,” noting that six justices in Crawford128 held that such a 
standard “should govern equal protection challenges to burdens on 
electoral participation.”129 According to Tokaji, § 2 vote denial challenges 
can be analyzed under two separate constitutional grounds, the right to 
vote and the prohibition against intentional discrimination based on race 
or other protected class status.130  
Tokaji’s proposed test incorporates (with some refinements) the two 
elements from the above-mentioned district court test and adds a third 
element based on Anderson-Burdick —defendants must “show by clear 
and convincing evidence” that the state’s interests in passing the law 
outweigh the burden on voting created by it.131  This test gives the state 
more room to make its case and potentially assuages any concerns the 
Court may have that the first two elements of the test are too easily 
satisfied.132 This is important because in cases where § 2 reaches conduct 
that does not violate the Constitution, there is a higher likelihood that 
justices will disagree on whether or not regulating such conduct 
impermissibly extends Congress’s enforcement power.  
III. DISCUSSION 
The advent of COVID-19 and the resulting burden placed on the courts 
by the exploding number of election law challenges calls for Anderson-
Burdick’s continued use and expanded application. The utility of a well-
known and often-applied doctrine cannot be understated when pandemic-
 
 126. Johnson, supra note 125 at 493. 
 127. Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote Denial, 50 HARVARD CIV. RTS.-CIV. 
LIBERTIES L. REV. 439, 460 (2015). 
 128. Id. at 470. Tokaji includes Justice Breyer here, who applied a slightly different test that 
nonetheless balanced the burdens on voters against the benefit of the law.  
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. at 474. 
 132. Id. at 485. 
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related government measures collide with voting rights in the context of 
presidential elections. Courts need a familiar doctrine that can be applied 
uniformly in order to resolve as-applied challenges to state voting laws 
quicky and fairly. Section III(A) discusses the need for clarity regarding 
the proper application of Anderson-Burdick in order to meet this bar. 
Section III(B) demonstrates why some of the framework’s potential 
shortcomings are actually strengths and how it can be applied in 
conjunction with other analyses to ensure robust voter protections are 
maintained and reinforced during election related litigation. Section 
III(C) establishes that when courts apply the standard diligently, the 
framework’s inherent flexibility makes it well-suited for cases arising 
during the rapidly changing social conditions, whether brought on by the 
pandemic or other social and political factors.   
A. Resolving the Circuit Split: The Need for Clarity 
The circuit court cases concerning Anderson-Burdick reveal that the 
courts are not split on whether to apply the test to challenges related to 
the complexities of the pandemic, but rather on how to apply it based on 
the two interpretations offered by the Court in Crawford. While some like 
Justice Scalia have criticized Anderson-Burdick for its flexibility, the 
Supreme Court has recognized that “constitutional challenges to specific 
provisions of State election laws…cannot be resolved by any ‘litmus-
paper test’ that will separate valid from invalid restrictions.”133 
Furthermore, the tiers of scrutiny implicated by Anderson-Burdick have a 
long history of judicial gravitas stemming from their use in resolving 
particularly intractable constitutional issues in the areas of First 
Amendment and Due Process jurisprudence,134 making Anderson-
Burdick a useful and necessary tool. Given the arguments favoring the 
doctrine, the question now becomes how to resolve the circuit split 
identified by Chief Justice Roberts in Little v. Reclaim Idaho. As the cases 
above illustrate, the split is an interpretative one that results in a varied 
application of the test.135  
 
 133. Anderson v. Celebreeze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 
730 (1974)). 
 134. The tiered approach to judicial review is rooted in the Equal Protection Clause but has been 
expanded throughout the twentieth century as a tool for resolving tensions between “the presumed validity 
of government action” and the Constitutional rights of individual citizens. For an overview, see Calvin 
Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945 (2004). 
 135. For further reading on the apparent trend of federal appellate courts reversing district court 
decisions based on differing application of Anderson-Burdick in COVID-related voting cases, see Jim 
Rutenberg & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Federal Appeals Courts Emerge as Crucial for Trump in Voting Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/17/us/politics/federal-appeals-courts-
trump-voting.html; Hasen, supra note 35.  
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The district court opinions in Thompson and Miller and their respective 
appellate opinions reveal that the differing outcomes in each case turn on 
how rather than when courts apply Anderson-Burdick. Specifically, to 
what extent must the courts explore the states’ professed interests and how 
insistent must they be that those interests be precise and particularized?  
For example, in Thompson, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with the district 
court’s finding that the law in question placed a severe burden on the 
plaintiff’s First Amendment rights, finding instead that the law created 
only an intermediate burden and thus warranted intermediate scrutiny.136 
However, in analyzing the state’s interests and the attendant burden 
placed on voters, the court failed to conduct the “careful, ground-level 
appraisal both of the practical burdens on the right to vote and of the 
state's reasons for imposing those precise burdens.”137 Instead, the court 
accepted the state’s interests at face value and concluded that the interests 
were “compelling and well-established” without any further inquiry.138 In 
short, the court never required Ohio to “[put] forth the precise interests 
that are served by the ban.”139As a result, the court of appeals granted the 
state’s motion to stay the preliminary injunction issued by the district 
court without following Anderson-Burdick’s requirement to rigorously 
interrogate the state’s interests.140 Without robustly analyzing states’ 
interests in passing voting laws, the courts may be unduly favoring state 
interests at the expense of voters’ rights.  
Thompson’s shortcomings are evident when contrasted with the Eighth 
Circuit’s opinion in Miller. In Miller, the court also began by analyzing 
the degree of scrutiny required based on the burden the contested 
regulations placed on the plaintiffs.141 Like the Sixth Circuit in Thompson, 
the court of appeals found the burden imposed by the in-person signature 
law in Miller failed to rise to the level of severity necessary to trigger 
strict scrutiny.142 The court then analyzed the state’s interests involved. 
This is  where the analyses of the Sixth and Eighth Circuits diverge in 
important and material ways regarding their application of Anderson-
Burdick.  
Unlike the Thompson court, the Eighth Circuit followed Supreme 
Court precedent,143 engaged in a rigorous review of the specific state’s 
interests, and detailed why these interests justified the burden they placed 
 
 136. Thompson v. Dewine, 959 F.3d 804, 811 (6th Cir. 2020). 
 137. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 210 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting).  
 138. Thompson, 959 F.3d at 811. 
 139. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 448 (1992). 
 140. Thompson, 959 F.3d at 804. 
 141. Miller v. Thurston, 967 F.3d 727, 739 (8th Cir. 2020). 
 142. Id. at 740. 
 143. See e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 796-806 (1983); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 45-51 (1976); Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439-40 (1992). 
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on the plaintiffs.144 In other words, the court embarked on the analysis 
required by the Supreme Court, “shav[ing] down…the generalities raised 
by the State” in order to ascertain with a high degree of specificity the 
“aspects of claimed interests addressed by the law at issue.”145 Here, that 
analysis began where the Thompson analysis ended, acknowledging the 
state’s professed interest in protecting the integrity of its ballot initiative 
process.146 
In Miller, the court explained that the state’s interest went beyond 
simply guarding against corruption and fraud and explained how it also 
encompassed preventing mistakes regarding the type of signatures 
collected.147 The court provided support for this argument by referencing 
additional state statutes that require the use of in-person canvassing to 
protect these interests.148 Finally, the court noted that Arkansas had 
experienced actual ballot initiative fraud in the past, and therefore the 
state’s concerns regarding fraud were substantiated rather than merely 
speculative.149 Based on this concrete, particularized, and articulable 
analysis, the court then performed the balancing test required under 
Anderson-Burdick and found that the state’s interests outweighed the 
burden on plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.150 
When courts follow Supreme Court guidance in their application of 
Anderson-Burdick, the degree of scrutiny applied to analyze the state’s 
interest “is not to be made in the abstract, by asking whether [the interests] 
are highly significant values; but rather by asking whether the aspect of 
[those interests] addressed by the law at issue is highly significant.”151  
Tokaji’s addition of the clear and convincing standard to the existing 
Anderson-Burdick framework seeks to quantify the rigor required of a 
court’s inquiry into the states proffered interests in order to clarify the 
application of the test. Although not expressly calling for the clear and 
convincing standard, the Supreme Court implicitly endorsed a similar 
degree of rigor in Anderson, stating:  
[A] court must resolve such a challenge by an analytical process that 
parallels its work in ordinary litigation…[i]t must identify and evaluate the 
precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden 
imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only 
determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests; it also 
 
 144. Miller, 967 F.3d at 740. 
 145. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 584 (2000) (emphasis deleted). 
 146. Miller, 967 F.3d at 740. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id.  
 150. Id. at 741. 
 151. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 584 (2000). 
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must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to 
burden the plaintiff's rights.152 
When courts faithfully execute this type of inquiry, no matter the case, 
Anderson-Burdick becomes less amorphous and provides the courts with 
a useful tool, enabling them to decide cases and honor the Supreme 
Court’s edict that “voting is of the most fundamental significance under 
our constitutional structure.”153 
B. Why Potential Shortcomings are Actually Strengths 
As pandemic-related election law challenges continue to make their 
way through U.S. courts, weaknesses in the American election process 
are coming to the forefront. In particular, there is “deep polarization” and 
the potential for significant partisanship, with Republicans striving to 
make voting more challenging and Democrats favoring laws that lower 
barriers to voting and increase enfranchisement.154 Despite being 
criticized as too unstructured, Anderson-Burdick’s flexibility 
complements other analyses commonly used in these cases, providing 
courts with robust measures to resolve increasingly complex election law 
litigation.  
For example, in cases where the legislature proposes to roll back 
previously available options for registering and/or voting, Anderson-
Burdick standing alone may fall short of providing sufficient clarity to 
fully cognize the burden on voters. However, adding a due process 
analysis that focuses on “partisan deviations from the norm of fair play, 
and the constitutionally appropriate protection of reasonable expectations 
from unjustifiable retrogressive unsettling of those expectations” 
strengthens Anderson-Burdick and assures voting laws are not tainted 
with partisanship.155  
The same analysis could apply to cases where the legislature refuses to 
change voting laws in light of COVID-19. While application of 
Anderson-Burdick is likely to reveal violations of the equal protection 
rights of voters at high risk for complications from COVID-19, a 
simultaneous due process analysis may reveal partisan motivations for 
refusing to adapt to social conditions created by the virus. As Professor 
Edward Foley explained, “if one party seeks to control the electoral 
process to give itself an unfair advantage, that power grab is a 
constitutional problem independent of whether it violates the equal 
 
 152. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789–90 (1983). 
 153. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).  
 154. Hasen, supra note 35 at 268. 
 155. Edward B. Foley, Due Process, Fair Play, and Excessive Partisanship: A New Principle for 
Judicial Review of Election Laws, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 655, 746 (2017). 
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treatment of similarly situated voters.”156 Thus, the concurrent application 
of Anderson-Burdick and a due process analysis of the challenged law 
would result in stronger protection of voter rights, countering any partisan 
influence that may exist.  
The same advantages accrue when applying Anderson-Burdick as part 
of the adjudication in vote denial claims, particularly those that arise 
under § 2 of the VRA. Some plaintiffs have argued that states’ refusals to 
modify election laws for minority voters disproportionately impacted by 
the pandemic run afoul of § 2 of the VRA, resulting in vote denial.157 Vote 
denial cases “implicate the value of participation…being able to register, 
vote, and have one’s vote counted.”158 Therefore, when states refuse to 
moderate their election laws to accommodate the increased risks COVID-
19 imposes on American minority voters, the state impermissibly reduces 
those voters’ abilities to participate in elections and therefore violates § 
2. Importantly, Tokaji’s test for vote denial claims expressly draws on 
Anderson-Burdick as an existing constitutional doctrine, grounding it in 
established Supreme Court precedent in order to protect § 2 from a 
conservative majority that seems intent on limiting, rather than 
expanding, voter protections.159  
C. Anderson-Burdick is Uniquely Suited to the Demands of COVID-
Related Election Litigation 
For significant subsets of American voters, voting during the pandemic 
presents markedly greater challenges.160 As a result, voting regulations 
that limit the use of absentee ballots, ban curbside voting, or require that 
absentee ballots be signed by a witness are being challenged in court on 
the grounds that voters who are at high risk of contracting COVID-19 are 
being unduly burdened by these laws.161 The Crawford Court recognized 
and endorsed the utility of Anderson-Burdick when analyzing special 
burdens that may apply to certain subsections of voters depending on the 
facts of a case.162  
The comparison of the cases in this Section further validates the utility 
of Anderson-Burdick for analyzing ballot initiative cases arising in the 
unique legal landscape that the COVID-19 pandemic created. 
 
 156. Id. at 749. 
 157. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986). 
 158. Tokaji, supra note 128, at 442. 
 159. Id. at 473; see also supra note 10. 
 160. Supra Section II(E). 
 161. See People First of Ala. v. Merrill, 467 F. Supp. 3d 1179 (N.D. Ala. June 15, 2020); Texas 
Democratic Party v. Abbott, 461 F.Supp. 3d 406 (W.D. Tex. May 19, 2020), vacated and remanded, 978 
F.3d 168 (5th Cir. 2020). 
 162. Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Board, 553 U.S. 181, 202 (2008). 
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Additionally, proper application of Anderson-Burdick to cases where the 
pandemic disproportionately affects certain groups of voters enables the 
district courts to ensure that the state “in no way freezes the status quo, 
but implicitly recognizes the potential fluidity of American political 
life.”163 The fact-specific analyses required by Anderson-Burdick 
facilitate the courts’ application of a nuanced, sliding scale of scrutiny 
under which the interest of the state in passing a voting law is balanced 
against the law’s burden on the voter in those specific circumstances. This 
would ensure case outcomes are within the bounds of voters’ First 
Amendment rights as well as the similarly-bestowed states’ rights to 
“choose among many permissible options when designing elections.”164  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Anderson-Burdick developed through a line of cases notable for their 
lack of clarity, with the Supreme Court’s plurality and dissenting opinions 
in Crawford leaving the lower courts left to their own devices when 
determining how it should be applied. Nevertheless, the utility of 
Anderson-Burdick is evidenced by its application in a wide range of 
voting rights and election law cases in the lower courts. Whether voting 
rights are under attack from societal pressures caused by an external event 
like the pandemic, or political pressures such as the increasing partisan 
divide animating voting rights legislation and litigation, Anderson-
Burdick’s doctrinal validity ensures that lower courts will continue to use 
it to resolve these cases. 
Thus, rather than discarding Anderson-Burdick, the Court should 
clarify its application and insist that lower courts rigorously interrogate 
the government’s proffered interest to determine if it truly warrants the 
burden the contested law imposes on voters. This would respect the 
principle of stare decisis, resolve the conflicting interpretations resulting 
from the opinion in Crawford, and render the amorphous test more easily 
applied—all without sacrificing the inherent flexibility necessary for 
adjudication of varied and complex election litigation, particularly arising 
in times of crisis. Further, courts’ abilities to apply Anderson-Burdick in 
conjunction with other forms of constitutional analyses will ensure 
dynamic and enduring protections for voters’ rights in future challenges 
beyond the pandemic.  
The issues discussed in this Comment may soon be resolved with 
guidance from the Supreme Court. In October, the Court consolidated two 
 
 163. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 439 (1971). 
 164. Thompson v. DeWine, 959 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2020). 
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election law cases from the Ninth Circuit165 and granted certiorari.166 The 
case will review two en banc opinions from the Ninth Circuit, which 
found that a state law barring ballot harvesting and an Arizona policy 
requiring voters to vote at their assigned precinct167 each violated § 2 of 
the VRA due to their disproportionate impact on minorities.168 By 
granting certiorari in these cases, the Court will have an opportunity to 
rule on vote denial claims arising under § 2, and may also revisit 
Anderson-Burdick for the first time since Crawford.169  While these cases 
all originated prior to the pandemic, the Court’s resolution of the case is 
likely to grant much-needed clarity in this area of election law.  
 
 
 165. The cases below are Democratic Nat'l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. 
granted sub nom. Arizona Republican Party v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 221 (2020), and cert. 
granted sub nom. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 222 (2020). 
 166. Amy Howe, Justices Add Seven New Cases to Docket, Including Major Voting Rights Dispute, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 2, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/justices-add-seven-new-cases-to-
docket-including-major-voting-rights-dispute/. 
 167. Ballots of voters who vote at a precinct other than which they are assigned are destroyed. 
 168. Howe, supra note 166. 
 169. Id. 
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